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* Abstract
This paper characterizes the class of incentive compatible contracts and
establishes absolute continuity of an optimal wage -employment contract in an
environment where one party to the contract receives private information about
a random variable which can take on a continuum of values. Previous work on
optimal contracting has either simply assumed such a contract exists in a
restricted set of functions -- typically continuous, piecewise smooth
functions --or has limited attention to problems in which workers' utility is
additively separable in money income -- a formulation which is unacceptably
restrictive for applications to wage -employment contracting.
Our existence result uses neither the additively separable formulation,
nor any prior assumption of continuity or differentiability of the contract to
be implemented. The paper then characterizes the optimal contract, using
necessary and sufficient conditions developed by Rockafellar for functions of
bounded variation. These conditions establish that the optimal contract is
absolutely continuous.
*! thank Larry Benveniste, Narayana Kocherlakota, Andreu Mas-Collel, Mark
Feldman, Flavio Menezes, Danyang Xie , Nicholas Yannelis and particularly
Stefan Krasa and Paul Roraer for helpful comments and suggestions. An
anonymous referee provided helpful suggestions as well.

This paper examines a class of wage -employment contracting models in
which the employer receives private information about labor productivity and
writes a contract with a risk-averse employee. It establishes that the
optimal incentive compatible contract exists for such a problem, and is an
absolutely continuous function of the realization of the private information.
Previous analyses of the optimal contracting problem have taken one of
two routes: either they have worked with a discrete state space or they have
simply assumed that the optimal contract is absolutely continuous. With a
discrete state space, existence is easily verified, but the characterization
of the contract is cumbersome and not easily analyzed. For a continuous state
space, L£ the optimal contract exists and is absolutely continuous, then it
can be characterized by a set of differential equations. We show that this is
always the case in a wide class of models.
If we restricted contracts to a compact set -- for example, absolutely
continuous functions satisfying a Lipschitz condition -- then existence would
be easy to verify. Such a procedure is natural in handling optimal growth
models, where the restriction can often be justified on physical grounds. For
example, limits on physical capacity to invest can be used to justify
imposition of bounded growth rates. (See Romer (1986) for a discussion and
critique)
.
In an incentive problem, the analogue would be to restrict the degree of
responsiveness of the terms of a contract to changes in the underlying state.
Such a restriction is unnatural -- indeed, there is no good reason to refrain
from considering as contracts functions which are discontinuous in the state
space. Step functions, for example, are common in observed contracts and so
certainly should not be ruled out as infeasible.
Previous proofs of existence on a continuous state space have been
limited by the assumption that the uninformed agent is risk neutral. In this
case the optimal contract is a non-decreasing selection from the function
which would be optimal in the absence of incentive constraints. In the
context of wage -employment contracts, a risk-neutral worker is an extremely
restrictive assumption, but the procedures used for the risk-neutral case do
not extend to more general forms of preferences.
In the first section we establish existence of an optimum by showing that
the set of incentive compatible contracts is weakly compact. Existence
follows quickly. The remainder of the paper uses Hamiltonian techniques to
derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a contract to be a optimum in
this class and uses the conditions in two applications. The first application
demonstrates that the optimum is in fact absolutely continuous. The second
application exhibits examples of optimal separating and pooling contracts
using the Hamiltonian conditions.
Literature Review
Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) examine the existence question for a class
of optimal contracting models in which the uninformed agent is risk neutral in
transfer payments. They restrict attention to the class of piecewise C.
functions while noting that the results will hold in a broader category.
Their structure is similar to that examined by Mussa and Rosen (1978),
Lolliver and Rochet (1983), and Goldman, Leland and Sibley (1984).
Kahn and Scheinkman (1985) examine the optimal contracting problem for a
more general class of utility functions for the uninformed agent. They
characterize the optimal contract assuming that it exists and is absolutely
continuous. Similar models with finite state spaces are investigated by Chari
(1983) and Sappington (1983).
Page (1987), derives an existence proof for an optimal contracting
model. Since his structure requires the set of actions available to the
informed agent be compact, it is more useful for hidden action models than for
the hidden information model examined here.
The Problem
A worker and a firm are endeavoring to establish the optimal contract for
labor and wages, given that productivity of labor is random and observable
only by the firm. The random variable d represents the productivity shock,
which is observed by the firm but not by the worker. We assume
(1) The support of d is the non-negative interval [a,b]
(2) The distribution of 6 is absolutely continuous. Let q(^) denote a
density.
The variable y will represent the labor provided by the worker to the
firm, 1 representing the worker's total endowment. The variable r will
represent payments by the firm to the worker. We place no a priori
restrictions on the values that r can take.
The worker's objective is the maximization of the expectation of the
utility function
U(y,r)
We assume the function is concave, increasing in r and decreasing in y.
The firm's profits are
7r(^,y) - r
where tt is continuous. In subsequent sections of the paper we will confine
attention to the case where
7r(^,y) = ^y. (1)
This is less restrictive than it appears; the analysis easily extends to
all cases of so-called multiplicative uncertainty.
A contract is a pair of real-valued, measurable functions (y(.).r(.)) on
[a,b] . The value y(^) represents the labor required and the value r(^)
represents the compensation given in realization 6 . The labor requirement
y{d) must satisfy
< y{e) < 1. (2)
In a feasible contract, (2) holds for all values of ^ . In an a. e . feasible
contract (2) holds except on a set of measure zero.
The contract is individually rational if it gives the firm an
exogenously-specified required level of expected profits C. Without loss of
generality we can take that required level to be zero, so that an individually
rational contract satisfies the following constraint:
/ (^(^y(^)) - r(d)) q(e) de > o (3)
By the revelation principle we can focus on incentive compatible
contracts. A contract is incentive compatible on set 9 if
^(^,y(^)) - r(^) > 7r(^,y(?)) - r(?) for all ^ , ? in 9 (4)
If 9 = [a,b] the contract is incentive compatible
.
If 9 = [a,b] - H where H is
a set of measure zero, then the contract is a . e . incentive compatible .
Thus in attempting to find the optimal contract for the firm and worker
we are searching for a solution to the following problem (Problem A)
:
Among all individually rational, a.e. feasible, a.e. incentive compatible
contracts find the one which maximizes
J U(y(5),r(^)) q(^) de
The difficulty in solving Problem A is that the incentive compatibility
requirement involves an uncountable number of inequality constraints. To
demonstrate existence, we will modify the problem to include the following
participation constraint:
J U(y(5),r(5)) q(^) d6 > U(0,0) (5)
Since U(0,0) can be achieved with a contract satisfying constraints (2-4)
(for example r{d) ^ 0, y(^) = 0), problem A has a solution whenever the
modified problem has a solution.
In the remainder of this section we will provide an existence proof which
works whenever the employee is risk neutral. In the subsequent section we
will provide an alternate existence proof which works for risk averse
preferences as well.
Lemma: The set of contracts satisfying constraints (2-5) is uniformly bounded.
Proof: Define
TT = max 7r(5,y) and tt = min n{9 ,y) for 6 G [a,b] and y G [0,1].
By constraint (2) y( . ) is uniformly bounded. We show that r(.) is
uniformly bounded by
B = 27r - TT.
For any function satisfying (2) and (4), for all 6,9 outside of H,
n - r(5) > By(d) -r(^) > 5y(?) - r(^) > n - r(^)
.
(6)
If r(tf) > B then (6) implies
inf-r r(?) > B + TT - TT.
d —
Thus
J (jr(e,y(e)) - r(^)) q(^) d^ < ^ - inf^ r(?) < 2^ - tt - B < 0.
This violates constraint (3). On the other hand, if -r(5) > B, then (5)
implies
sup r(^) < n - n - B.
Thus
J U(y(fl),r(<?)) q(^) d^ < U(0, sup^ r(^)) < U(0, n - n - B) < U(0,0)
violating constraint (5).
Theorem 1
:
If the set of a.e. incentive compatible contracts is convex, then
the set of contracts satisfying conditions (2-5) is weakly compact.
2 2
Proof: Consider the set of contracts satisfying (2-5) as a subset of L x L .
Since it is uniformly bounded, it is relatively compact in the weak star
topology by the Alouglu-Bourbaki Theorem (see for example, Shaefer (1970),
p. 84). It is closed in the norm topology. It is also convex. Therefore it is
weakly closed (Shaefer p. 65, Corollary 2).
It follows that provided the function describing a firm's expected
profits generates a convex set of a.e. incentive compatible contracts and the
consumer's expected utility functional is weakly continuous, a solution to
problem A exists.
The structure of the set of incentive compatible contracts
In the case of multiplicative uncertainty (equation 1) , it is readily
verifiable that the set of incentive compatible contracts is convex. Thus the
result of the previous section provides a general existence theorem as long as
the expected utility functional is weakly continuous. In the context of wage
employment contracting, weak continuity is a strong assumption. Balder and
Yannelis (1991) demonstrate that weak continuity effectively requires
linearity of the functional or, in other words, risk neutrality on the part
of the employee. (See also Bewley (1972) for an early example of this point.)
To demonstrate existence in the case of risk averse consumers , a more
detailed analysis of the set of incentive compatible contracts is necessary.
If we were to restrict attention to absolutely continuous functions, the
necessary and sufficient conditions for incentive compatibility would be
y'(^) > a.e., (7)
and ^y'(^)=r'(^)a.e.. (8)
(see for example, Kahn - Scheinkman (1985).) In this section we establish
general necessary and sufficient conditions for incentive compatibility. We
begin by showing that in the case of multiplicative uncertainty, we can
strengthen restrictions (2) and (4) without loss of generality.
Lemma
:
If the contract is incentive compatible on 6
, y is non-decreasing on 6.
Proof :
which implies
[6^ - e^] [y{e^) - y{e^)] > o.
Lemma : If a contract (y(.).r(.)) is a.e. feasible and a.e. incentive
compatible, then it is a.e. equal to a contract which is feasible and
incentive compatible.
A A
Proof : We will construct such a contract (y(.).r(.)). By the previous
lemma, the function y( . ) is equal, outside of a measure-zero set J, to a non
A
decreasing function which satisfies (2) for all d. Let y be any such function.
A A
Define z(6) = 6 y{6) - r(5) on [a,b]-H-J. (4) implies z is continuous. For
points in H u J, take the continuous extension; this always exists. Finally
A A A
define to (8) = ey(0) - z(9) .
A
In the case of multiplicative uncertainty, z is a convex function. This
is sufficient to guarantee that (4) holds for all 6 .
Thus as long as uncertainty is multiplicative, there is an optimal
contract in which incentive compatibility holds everywhere, not merely almost
everywhere. This point is of importance for the characterization which
follows.
Theorem 2: For the contract (y(.).^y(-) - z(.)) to be (everywhere)
incentive compatible, the following two conditions are necessary and
sufficient:
y(
.
) is non decreasing. (9)
y(^) e d z(e) for all 6. (10)
Proof: Necessity: The lemma implies (9) . (4) may be rewritten as
z{d) > z(?) + (5 - ?) y(?) for all 6, 1
.
(11)
which implies y(?) belongs to the subgradient of z at ?.
Sufficiency: (9) and (10) mean that z is convex. (11) follows immediately.
Whenever a profit function exhibits the single crossing property, as it
does in the case of multiplicative uncertainty, then a function y( . ) is
implementable (that is, there exists a function r(.) such that the contract
(y(.).r(.)) is incentive compatible) if and only if y( . ) is non decreasing
(see for example Rochet (1987), p. 197.) Since a subgradient determines a
unique convex function z(.) (see Rockafellar, 1970, p. 232) we can conclude
that for the case of multiplicative uncertainty, the function r( . ) which
implements y(.) is unique (up to an additive constant).
Let y be the set of all non-decreasing functions y: [a,b] = [0,1]. For
each y in y, let z(y) denote the corresponding profit function which yields
zero expected profits. In other words
[z(y)](^) - ll y(^3_) de^ - k
where
K - ;^ q(e^) jj- y(e^) dd^ de^
Thus 2(y) is a continuous function of y in the norm topology on V , and
expected utility E{U(y, Oy - z(y))) is a continuous function of y in the norm
2topology on V. Since V is compact we conclude
Theorem 3
:
A solution to Problem A exists.
o
Characterization of the Solution
Suppose that for a solution the optimal contract takes on values (v, r)
and (y, r) at 8 = a and ^ = b respectively. Then the optimal contract is
also the solution to a problem of Lagrange for fixed endpoint values (y, r)
and (y, r) . We exploit duality results by Rockafellar (1975) for Lagrange
problems for arcs of bounded variation. To use these results it is first
necessary to recharacterize the problem. We consider the transformed variable
dy - r
We recast the problem as a search for the optimal pair of functions y(.),
z(.), where a contract is of the form (y( . ) , ^y(.)-z(.)).
Following Rockafellar we initially couch the maximization problem as a
search for the absolutely continuous function which minimizes a certain
concave objective functional. We then extend the definition of this
functional to the domain of functions of bounded variation, checking to ensure
that this extended functional indeed corresponds to the incentive problem we
are interested in solving. Let x and x' denote the following vectors:
X -
L y'J
In transformed variables, the objective is the minimization of the
following integral
/ L( 8, x(e), x'id) ) dd .
where the integrand is defined as follows:
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L( 8,
y
.
y'.
U(y, ^y - z) q(^) d^
if z' - y and y' >
°o otherwise
The conditions
z ' = y a . e
y' > a.e
(12)
(13)
are the transformation of (7) and (8), the necessary and sufficient conditions
for incentive compatibility in the case of absolutely continuous functions.
Thus the integral is infinite if the contract is not incentive compatible.
Note that L( 5 , . , . ) is a convex function.
In the restricted form, Problem A can therefore be restated as follows
(Problem B)
:
Find absolutely continuous functions y(.) and z(.) to minimize
! u 0,
z(e)
'
y(^)
.
>
z'(9)
y'id)
) de
Subject to
y(a) = y
y(b) = y
z(a) = ay
z(b) = by
(14)
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Note that it is not necessary to explicitly state the feasibility
requirement (2). Since the endpoints y and y lie within the feasible range,
and y(.) is a non decreasing function, the feasibility conditions will be
satisfied almost everywhere. This allows us to write the problem without
including state constraints, enabling us to conclude that the costate
variables for the problem are absolutely continuous (see Rockafellar (1972).
Consider the Hamiltonian function
H(5,x,p) = sup^^2 { p • V - L(5, X, v) )
where p - e R
Then
H(5,
LPoJ
if P2 >
p- y + q(^) U(y, 6y - z) otherwise
For problems of Lagrange, optimal solutions can generally be
characterized by a costate variable
p(tf) : [a,b] = R^
such that the pair (x(.),p(.)) satisfy the following Hamiltonian condition:
(-p'(^), x'(^)) G a H(^ x(^), p(^)) a.e. (15)
where d H denotes the set of all subgradients of the concave -convex
Hamiltonian function H(^, ., .).
For Problem B the Hamiltonian conditions are as follows:
p^'(^) = q(5) U^ (16)
12
V^'(8) - -p^ - (^U^ + Uy) q{e) (17)
P2(^) < (18)
y' (6) > (19)
^^(9) - if y'(5) > (20)
Although it can be demonstrated that these conditions are necessary and
sufficient for an optimum, we cannot prove existence directly in the class of
absolutely continuous functions. Instead we must extend the problem to
functions of bounded variation. Since z and y are non-decreasing functions in
any incentive compatible contract, they are of bounded variation. Therefore we
know a solution exists in this class.
If a function f from an interval [t^, t., 1 to R is of bounded variation
1
then it gives rise to a Borel measure on [t_,t..], which we will denote df.
This measure can be decomposed into an absolutely continuous measure and a
singular measure with respect to Lebesgue measure. The function can then be
represented as follows: o
f(e) - ff'(e) 69 + f 4> (9) dr{9)
where f denotes the derivative of f, so that f d^ denotes the absolutely
continuous measure. dr is a singular measure with respect to Lebesgue
measure, and (^ is a Borel measurable function. If <^ =0 almost everywhere
with respect to dr , then f (
.
) is an absolutely continuous function.
The definition of the objective function is extended to arcs of bounded
variation as follows:
J L( 9, x(B), x'(9) ) d9 + J I^ (^(9)) dr(^) (21)
13
where ^(8) dr(5) is a representation of the singular portion of the .measure
of X, and L^ ( . ) is the recession function of L ( 9, x(tf), .)
(Given a closed, proper convex function f (
.
) the recession function f (
•
) is
defined as follows:
f(x + Ay) - f(x)
f^(x) = lim
A = « A
See Rockafellar (1970) section 8 for details.)
In the case at hand the recession function is as follows
-1
if r = and u >
= <= otherwise
Note that for our purposes this is the correct extension of the problem:
o
It requires that the function z be absolutely continuous, as it must in the
incentive compatible contract since it is a convex function. It requires that
y be non decreasing, as it must in an incentive compatible contract. In other
words, the conditions (12) and (13) plus the following two:
f(^) - a.e. r (22)
v(e) > a.e. T
'
(23)
are a restatement of conditions (9) and (10), the general necessary and
sufficient conditions for an incentive compatible contract.
Thus Problem A is equivalent to the following problem
14
(Problem C)
:
Minimize (19) by choice of x( . ) from among the functions of bounded
variation which satisfy endpoint conditions (14)
.
Theorem 4: If the optimal contract does not have y(^) equal to a
constant a.e. 6, then the following are necessary and sufficent conditions for
(y(-). !(.)) to be an optimal contract, where r(.) = 8y(.) - z(.)-
There exists an absolutely continuous costate variable p(^) such that
(a) The Hamiltonian conditions (16) -(20) are satisfied.
(b) In addition, the following extended Hamiltonian conditions are
satisfied:
f(.) - a.e. T (24)
u(.) > a.e. r (25)
u(.) - or P2() - a.e. r (26)
Proof: See Appendix.
Comments
:
Again p(.) is absolutely continuous because there are no explicit
state constraints in the problem. Conditions (24) and (25) are restatements
of conditions (22) and (23) which are part of the conditions for incentive
compatibility in this extended problem; the rest of the incentive
compatibility requirements are included in the basic Hamiltonian conditions.
Condition (26) is the natural extension of condition (20); together they say
that y(.) can only increase on sets where p^(.) is identically zero. Note
that on the surface these conditions make no claim about the absolute
continuity of y(.) or r(.).
The conditions of theorem 4 are sufficient for a contract to be optimal
provided there exists an optimum with endpoints (y.,r) (y,r). The conditions
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can be extended to general sufficienc conditions by adding in transversality
conditions as discussed in Rockafellar (1972).
Thus either the Harailtonian conditions hold or the optimal contract is a
constant contract. It is not difficult to describe necessary and sufficient
conditions for the optimal contract to be constant; these conditions are
easily verified in any particular case and turn out to be identical to the
conditions for a constant contract to be optimal in the absence of incentive
constraints. To state the conditions concisely, we need two more definitions:
A constant contract is one with y(^) equal to some constant y for almost
all 6 and r(^) equal to some constant r for almost all 6.
(If y(^) is constant in an incentive compatible contract, then so is
r(^).)
For a utility level of V, define the truncated indifference curve R(«,V)
as the following closed convex function:
R(«,V) - inf {r | U(r,y) > V) if < y < 1
= <=o otherwise
Theorem 5
:
A constant contract (y, r) is optimal for Problem A if and only
if it solves the problem in the absence of incentive constraints (that is,
omitting constraints (4)). In either case the following are necessary and
sufficient conditions for y, r to be optimal:
(a) r = y Ed
(b) the set [a,b] is in the subgradient at y of the truncated
indifference curve
R(
.. U(y, r))
16
Proof: Since a constanc contract is automatically incentive compatible, we
know immediately that if the constant contract is optimal in the absence of
the incentive constraints, it is also optimal for the incentive constrained
problem. Therefore it suffices to show two facts: (1) A constant contract for
which (a) and (b) do not hold is dominated by another incentive compatible
contract, and (2) If (a) and (b) hold for some constant contract (y, r) , then
(X. r) is optimal for the problem without incentive constraints.
(1) (a) is the requirement that the contract give exactly zero profits to the
firm. If it gives less, the contract violates (2); if it gives more then an
increase in r improves worker welfare. If (b) does not hold, then there is a
pair (y*. r*) such that < y* < 1 and U(y*, r*) > U(x, r) for which
^y* - r* > ^j - r on some interval of 6
.
The c!t>ntract in which the firm chooses between the pairs (y*, r*) and (^, r)
dominates the constant contract.
(2) A constant contract has optimal risk sharing since any risk has been
placed on the risk-neutral firm. A contract satisfying (b) is "productively
efficient" in all states -- that is, in all states the allocation y,r is ex
post Pareto optimal. These two conditions are sufficient for a contract to be
Pareto optimal ex ante; the ex ante Pareto optimal contract which yields
expected profits of zero solves the full- information optimal contracting
problem.
Comment
:
Condition (b) in theorem 5 covers three possibilities. A constant
contract is optimal if and only if one of the following conditions hold: 1.
The right derivative of the worker's indifference curve at the point (0,0) is
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greater than b. (In this case the contract with no work and no pay is optimal)
2. The left derivative of the worker's indifference curve at the point (1, E^)
is greater than a. (In this case the optimal contract has y = 1 always). 3.
The indifference curve tangent to the locus r = y E5 has a kink sharp enough
to include the whole range [a,b] (In this case the point at the kink is the
optimal contract.) (See figures). Unless one of these three cases occurs,
the duality conditions characterize the optimal contract.
Applications
In this section we provide two applications of the duality conditions to
the analysis of optimal contracts. The first application is a theorem which
establishes that the optimal contract is in fact absolutely continuous as long
as the utility function is strictly concave. The second application uses the
Hamiltonian conditions to provide examples in which the optimal contract
exhibits pooling.
Theorem 6
:
Suppose the function U is twice continuously differentiable and
strictly concave in the directions [a,b] (i.e., U(y, r^ + ^ y) is a strictly
concave function of y for all S in [a,b]). If q(^) is positive and continuous
for 8 G (a,b) then the optimal contract is absolutely continuous.
Proof: Assume the optimum is not constant, otherwise the result holds
immediately. The proof makes use of equation (17) of the necessary conditions.
The right side of this equation (and therefore the left) is a function of
bounded variation. We first demonstrate that the measure representing the
singular portion of the right side is non positive.
Define
:
r R(J(0,0))
Figure 1
rFigure 2
(!(J(U))|
Alb
''
1
Figure 3
W(^, y) = -{e U^(y, By - z(e)) + U (y, dy - z(5))) q(5)
And let
AW(a,;9) - W(^.y(^)) - W(a,y(Q)) for a,fi in [a.b]
By the mean value theorem
AW(a,^) = W (5, y(e)) (0 - a) + W (^ y(^)) (y(0) - y(Q))
(/ y
for some in [a,p], provided y is continuous on the range [a,y9]. If y is
discontinuous at 9 , then
AW(?_,?^) = Wy(?, y) (y(?._^) = y(?_))
for some y G [y(?_), y(?^)].
Since U is concave,
W (9, y) = -(^^ U + 25 U + U ) q(9) >
y "^ rr ry yy "
Thus in particular, W(
., y(.)) increases across discontinuities
We conclude that
AW[a,b] = /Wd5 + JW dy.
So that the singular portion of the measure of W is
; W^ V dr(d) (27)
19
which is non negative.
Let u be concentrated on the set N, that is
N = ( 5 1 u{e) > )
By the conditions above, N is a set of measure zero [6], and a subset of the
points where p„ = 0. Since p. < everywhere, this implies that at
discontinuities in p^ '
,
p^ ' must be falling, contradicting equation (17).
Therefore p^ ' is continuous. The function p_' can be written as the
difference of two measures. rj and rj . It must be the case that rj be
absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, while the singular
portion of ry is equal to the singular portion of W and so is concentrated on
the set N. On this set p- ' =0 -- that is , r; = rj on all intervals whose
endpoints lie in N. Theorem 8 of the appendix demonstrates that this is
sufficient to conclude that rj is absolutely continuous as well. Having
demonstrated that the left side of (17) is absolutely continuous, we conclude
that the right side is as well, so that (27) is on any set. Provided W is
non-zero on N, we can conclude that u is zero and y is absolutely continuous.
For W to be non zero, it is sufficient that U is strictly concave in the
directions [a,b], and q(^) > on T.
Separating and Pooling: An Example
Suppose the utility function takes the form
12 12U(r,y) = 10 r -
I
r^ -
^
y^
for r < 10, y > 0. Suppose the density function takes the forr
20
q(^) = k / d
on the support [a, b]. The constant of proportionality A is determined by the
following expression:
A = [In (b/a)]"^
For this problem the Hamiltonian conditions reduce to
p^'(^) = A e'^ (H - r(^))
P2'(^) = -P]_(^) - A e'^ (d H-io(9)-y(6))
P2(^) <
y'(^) >
p^CO = if y'(^) >
9 y' (9) - r' (9) = 0.
The transversality conditions are
p^(a) = p^(b) -
P2(a) - p^Cb) = 0.
The previous results guarantee that there is a unique solution satisfying
these endpoint conditions. Given a level of ex ante required expected profits
C, as long as the endpoints a and b are sufficiently close together, it can be
shovm that the solution is separating. As the endpoints are stretched apart,
the solution involves pooling at the right endpoint. The following
figures show a separating and a pooling solution to the contracts; the
supports in the two examples are respectively [3.14, 9.60] and [2.84,
3
13.23]. In general pooling is more likely in regions in which density is
low. In the pooling example, the pooling interval is [9.40, 13.23].
21
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Previous work on optimal wage employment contracts has been able to
exhibit pooling outcomes only in situations where the worker is risk neutral.
This example demonstrates that pooling is robust to the assumption of risk
aversion on the part of the worker in the contract.
Conclusions and Extensions
This paper has characterized the complete set of incentive compatible
contracts for an optimal contracting problem involving a risk averse principal
and a continuous state space. We have demonstrated the existence of a
solution to the problem, characterized the solution in terms of
generalizations of the standard Hamiltonian conditions, and shown that these
conditions imply the solution is absolutely continuous.
Because the solution is absolutely continuous, the optimal contract is
characterized by a set of differential equations which can be conveniently
analyzed. We have exhibited a class of problems which generates pooling
contracts for a rboust set of parameter values. For further analysis of
separating and pooling contracts see Kahn (1988)
.
The following are a list of potential extensions of the above results:
1. The continuity of derivatives of the function U is not central to the
proof of absolute continuity. We conjecture that it can be extended to cover
all strictly concave utility functions, differentiable or not. Similarly,
absolute continuity with respect to the measure of the distribution of 6
probably holds for all 6 which are absolutely continuous with respect to
Lebesgue measure -- i.e. the restriction that q(^) > can probably be
dropped.
2. The requirement of concavity of the utility functions is not used in the
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models with risk neutral principals cited at the beginning of this paper. We
conjecture that it is in fact necessary in order to guarantee absolute
continuity of the optimal contract: otherwise it seems clear that there will
be an advantage to using contracts including explicit randomization. Our
structure can probably be generalized to handle non- concave utility functions
by using randomized contracts to convexify the problem.
3. It is easy to extend the preferences of the agent to include general forms
of multiplicative uncertainty. It is straightforward to generalize further to
a risk-averse agent. It is not clear whether the results generalize beyond
that case.
4. It is also not clear whether the results can be generalized to the case
where the function to be implemented has more than two dimensions. In this
case the characterization of implementable functions is more complicated (See
Rochet (1987)). For a preliminary analysis of this problem in the case of
labor contracts, see Kahn and Reagan (1989).
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APPENDIX
Let L( .
,
. , .) : [t^, t^] X r" X r" = IR U { « ) be a Lebesgue
measurable, lower semicontinuous function such that
1. for each t L(t, ., .) is convex
2. for each t, x, L(t, x, .) is not identically <» .
For a function x(.): [t^, t- ] = R of bounded variation, define the
objective functional J( x(
. ) ) as in (21).
Define the Lagrange problem:
choose x(
.
) among functions of bounded variation to minimize
J( x(.) )
subject to x(t^) - x, x(t-) - x
Define the Hamiltonian function
H(t,x,p) - sup^^n { p • V - L(t, X, v) }
Define the set of attainable endpoint pairs f to be the subset of R x R
consisting of all pairs (x^,x^) such that there exists a function of
bounded variation x(.) with endpoints x(t_) = x and x(t-) = x such that
Jj^( x(.) ) < « .
Theorem 7
:
(A) Let P(t) be the set of p such that H(t,x,p) < °° and suppose
P(.) satisfies the following conditions
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1. P( . ) is an upper seiniconCinuous correspondence
2. For all t P(t) has non empty interior.
(B) Suppose the pair (x, x) is in the relative interior of the set
of attainable endpoint pairs.
Then the function x( . ) solves the Lagrange problem if and only if there is
an absolutely continuous function p(.) : [t-^.t-] = R such that x(.) and
p(.) satisfy the following conditions:
(Al) (-p'(0, x'(^)) e 3 H(^, x(^). p(0) a.e.
(A2) p(t) belongs to the closure of P(t) for all t
(A3) For any representation of the measure of the singular portion of x
^(t) dr(t) - dx - X' dt
the following inequality holds almost everywhere [r] :
f(t) ( p* - p(t) ) < for all p* in the closure of P(t)
.
If p(t) is discontinuous at t, then the inequality holds for its
left and right limits.
Proof: See Theorem 4 of Rockafellar (1976) , of which this is a simplified
version.
Proof of Theorem 4 of the text : This theorem is an application of the
theorem above. For the particular problem in the paper,
?(e) - IR X IR_ for all 6,
Satisfying conditions (A)
.
For the problem at hand, feasible endpoint conditions (y,z,y,z)
satisfy the following equalities
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y - X + L ^(9) de
z -z + /^/^ u(^) d^ 69 + (b-a) y
for some non-negative function u(
.
) • Therefore points (j, z, y, z) in the
interior of the set f satisfy the following inequalities:
(b-a)]£ < z-z < (b-a)y
Letting r = ay - z and r - by - z
these conditions become
ay - r > ay - r
and
by - r > by - r
In other words, when 6 - a, the firm's profits from declaring 5 - a must be
strictly greater than the profits from declaring 6 - b, and vice versa.
Since the distribution of 6 has no atom at a or b, these conditions are
violated in an incentive compatible contract if and only if y is constant
almost everywhere.
Conditions (24)
-(26) follow from (A3) of the above theorem.
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Theorem 8
:
Suppose [a,b] is an interval with ^i Lebesgue measure on the Borel
measurable sets. Consider two measures:
C. « M
^^
= u + a
where u « ^i and a is singular with respect to /i - - that is, the measure is
concentrated on a set W of Lebesgue measure 0.
Suppose for any interval [t- ,t„] where t. e W, we have that
^^([t^.t^]) = ^^([t^.t^])
Then a = 0. ,
,
Proof:
Since a is singular with respect to ^, it is sufficient to show that ct « /i.
Suppose /i(T) = 0. Then /i(T n W) =0.
Let 5 be the set of all collections of the form {I ) such that I is an
n n
interval whose endpoints are in W, and U I 2 T n W
Then Inf l^ , (I^) -0
n
(For any set of measure zero, the outer measure is zero).
Since ^ « /i
,
n
(Represent ^ as an integral of /i, take a sequence of collections of the
form {I ) such that the measure of the union converges to zero).
Finally:
.(T) - .(T n W) < inf
,
, j Z„ ?,(!„) - Inf , ^ , Z„ ? . (I„) - 0.
n n
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NOTES
We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this simplification in
the case of risk neutrality.
2
Proof of total boundedness depends on finding a finite e-net for the set for
each e; see Kolmogorov and Fomin pp. 98-100. For each e there is some pair of
integers M, and N, such that all non-decreasing step functions of the
following form satisfy the requirement:
for n - 1 . .
.
, N, for integers < k < k^ ... k^ < M, for h = (a-b)/N.
f(d) = k /M for ^ e [ a+nh . a+(n+l)h ) .
3
C is respectively 104.5 for the separating example and 136.24 for the pooling
example
.
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